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Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled Consent 
Speech 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs• 
The topic of this symposium is "compelled commercial speech," and 
that is certainly one way to cut through the cases. This grouping seems to 
fit nicely into the existing Free Speech Clause categories. We have fully 
protected speech and commercial speech , and, within both of these areas, 
we have speech restraints and speech that a government entity compels the 
speaker to say. Commercial speech may be subject to greater government 
regulation than fully protected speech because the reason that the 
Constitution . protects it is different. 1 Similarly, government entities may 
compel commercial speakers to disclose information more freely than they 
may compel individuals to utter fully protected speech. 2 In fact, in the 
realm of fully protected speech , government-imposed compulsions are 
subject to the same high level of scrutiny as speech restraints. 3 This 
symmetry of treatment between speech compulsions and speech restraints 
does not, however, exist within commercial speech. The Constitution 
permits government entities to compel commercial speech more freely than 
they may restrain commercial speech , 4 and only one Justice on the current 
Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to reexamine this principle. 5 
Despite the fact that the standards of review for speech restraints and 
compulsions do not align precisely within the category of commercial 
speech as they do with fully protected speech, it would be possible to 
create a perfectly sensible jurisprudence by segregating the category of 
compelled commercial speech . The Court in Zauderer v. Office of 
• Thanks to Maureen Moran for helpful assistance with citations . 
1 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976) (commercial speech is entitled to "a different degree of [Free Speech Clause) protection" than 
fully protected speech) . 
2 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
( 1985) ("[T]he interests at stake [ where a government entity compels commercial speech disclosures J 
are not of the same order as those [ where the government compels individuals to utter fully protected 
speech].") . 
3 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (state may not compel individual to 
display "Live Free or Die" on his vehicle license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ . v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (state may not compel a child to recite the pledge of allegiance). 
4 Compare Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (strict scrutiny applies to fully protected compelled speech), 
with Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 647 (rational basis scrutiny applies to compelled commercial speech). 
5 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , PA v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) ("I am skeptical of the premis e . . . that, in the commercial speech context, 'the First 
Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirement s are substantially weaker than those at stake 
when speech is actually suppressed. "' (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n. 14)). 
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Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio6 started down this road 
by noting that because a different justification underlies the protection of 
commercial speech, 7 disclosure requirements imposed on commercial 
speakers do not present the same Free Speech Clause danger as 
commercial speech restraints. 8 The Court explicitly noted that the 
symmetry of speech doctrine that applies to restraints and compulsions of 
fully protected speech does not apply to commercial speech. 9 The potential 
for confusion in compelled speech doctrine arises, however, because the 
Court's interpretations of the scope of cmporate speech rights 10 and of the 
protection of commercial speakers from speech restraints 11 has been 
ratcheting upward . Corporate speakers have seized the opportunity to 
challenge government-imposed disclosure requirements over and over 
again, arguing that commercial speech compulsions should be reviewed 
under the same heightened standard as commercial speech restraints. 12 
These efforts have been effective, resulting in a smattering of inconsistent 
lower court decisions, as some courts hew to the Zauderer speech 
6 471 U.S. 626. 
7 Id. at 651 ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is 
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides ... appellant's 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising 
is minimal." (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976))). 
8 Id. at 651 n.14. 
9 Id. at 651 ("[By compelling commercial speech, the state J has not attempted to 'prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.' The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that 
appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms 
under which his services will be available." ( citation omitted) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)). 
10 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that 
corporations and labor unions have political speech rights). 
II See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (invalidating state restriction 
on sale of commercial information while finding unconstitutional content-based and speaker-based 
distinctions within the category of commercial speech); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 
357, 371 (2002) (invalidating restriction on advertising of compounded drugs and holding that the 
government did not prove that less restrictive means were not available). 
12 The Washington Legal Foundation litigates on behalf of corporate speech rights. As to its 
interpretations of compelled commercial speech doctrine, see, e.g., Sarah Roller & Donnelly 
McDowell, Biotech Food Labeling Proposal Raises First Amendment Concerns, LEGAL OPINION 
LETTER (Wash. Legal Found., D.C.), Oct. 19, 2012, at I, available 
at http://www.wlf.org/upload/Iegalstudies/legalopinionletter / I 0- I 9-12RollerMcDowell_Lega!OpinionL 
etter.pdf; Sarah Roller & Donnelly McDowell, "FOP" Food Labeling: The Energy Star® Model 
Raises First Amendment Concerns (Wash. Legal Found . Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, 
No. I 80, 2012), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies /workingpaper/RollerMcDowell 
WPFINAL.pdf; Charles M. English, Compelled Speech And The First Amendment: Neutral Fact Or 
Government Opinion?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., D.C.), Jan. 13, 2012, at I, 
available athttp ://www.wlf.org/upload/Iegalstudies /legalbackgrounder/1- I 3-12English_Lega!Backgro 
under.pdf. 
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restraint/disclosure requirement line and others look to the Court's 
changing commercial speech restraint jurisprudence as a signal to tighten 
judicial review of disclosure requirements. 13 Therefore, the theoretical 
distinctions that could have worked are not working in practice. The 
jurisprudence of compelled commercial speech is becoming warped due to 
the pull of other lines of cases that relate only superficially . To solidify the 
core of the compelled commercial speech cases, it is helpful to slice 
through the instances of government speech compulsions in a different 
way. 
Rather than grouping compelled commercial speech cases as a class to 
themselves, it is useful to recognize that most of these cases involve 
government compelled speech in connection with a sale transaction, and 
that compelled disclosures in the context of sale transactions are part of a 
broader group of compelled disclosures in interpersonal transactions. 
Viewing the cases this way makes a number of points clear. First, 
governments effectively require communication between parties to 
commercial transactions all the time as a routine, ordinary and accepted 
exercise of state police power or of the federal government's Commerce 
Clause power. Second, there is no basis in the Constitution to limit the 
deferential review of commercial disclosure requirements, articulated in 
Zauderer and reaffirmed in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States 14 to disclosure requirements aimed at correcting deceptive or 
misleading commercial speech. Rather, those instances are properly 
viewed as part of a subset of broader government authority to define the 
facts material to the consent that makes an interpersonal transaction legal 
and enforceable. Third, recognizing the inherent government power to 
define the facts material to valid consent makes sense of the subset of 
compelled commercial speech cases . It identifies the few disclosure 
requirements that fall out of bounds, and it makes clear that the primary 
13 Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (interpreting Zauderer and more recent Court cases as establishing "that a disclosure requirement 
is only appropriate if the government shows that , absent a warning , there is a self-evident - or at least 
'potentially real ' - danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers " (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't 
of Bus. & Prof! Regulation , 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994))) , with id. at 1227 n.6 (Rogers , J., dissenting) 
("As other circuits have recognized, in Zauderer the Supreme Court appears simply to have held that a 
government interest in protecting consumers from possible deception is sufficient to support a 
disclosure requirement - not that this particular interest is necessary to support such a requirement. " 
(citing Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 650-51 ; Disc . Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 
556 (6th Cir . 2012) ; N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C . Bd. of Health , 556 F.3d 114, 133 & n.21 (2d Cir. 
2009) ; Pharm . Care Mgmt. Ass 'n v. Rowe , 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (!st Cir. 2005) ; Nat ' ! Elec. Mfrs . 
Ass'n v. Sorell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001))) . 
14 559 U.S. 229 (2010) . 
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work to be done in the compelled speech jurisprudence is to identify what 
limits the Constitution places on the types of information governments 
require commercial speakers to present and how they must present it, not 
to argue over whether the government has the authority to require 
disclosures at all - it clearly does. 
A recent case decided in the Southern District of New York provides a 
useful structure that illustrates each of these points. The case does not 
clearly involve commercial speech. 15 In fact, the court held that it did not 
involve compelled speech at all. The case, Central Rabbinical Congress of 
the USA & Canada v. New York City Department of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 16 involved an amendment to the New York City Health Code, 
enacted in 2012, addressing the practice of direct oral suction circumcision 
performed in certain Orthodox Jewish communities on baby boys. 17 After 
two babies died following the procedure because of germ transfer, 18 the 
New York regulation requires the rabbis, or mohelim, to obtain written 
consent from the boys' parents before performing the procedure . The 
consent form may be supplied by the Department of Health or by the rabbi, 
but it must contain the following statement: 
I understand that direct oral suction will be performed on 
my child and that the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene advises parents that direct oral 
suction should not be performed because it exposes an 
infant to the risk of transmission of herpes simplex virus 
infection, which may result in brain damage or death. 19 
The mohelim claimed that the consent form requirement 
unconstitutionally compelled them to speak. 20 The court held that the 
15 The case involves a disclosure requirement imposed on the procedure of ritual circumcision. It is 
not clear in the case whether parents pay a fee to have the procedure performed . 
16 No. 12 Civ. 7590(NRB) , 2013 WL 126399 (S.D .N.Y. Jan. IO, 2013) . 
17 Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Article 181 of the New York City Health Code, 139 CITY 
REC. 2600 (Sept. 21, 2012) . 
18 Cent. Rabbini cal Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at •9 ("[T]he Department had found, since 2000 , 
eleven laboratory-confirmed cases of neonatal herpes in infants who had undergone a circumcision that 
definitely or likely involved direct oral suction . Of those eleven cases, two infants died and two 
suffered brain damage." (footnote and citation omitted)) . 
19 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE§ 181.21 (2012) . 
20 The mohelim claimed that the regulation unconstitutionally compelled them "' to pass along the 
Department 's "advice" against [the procedure]"' and that strict scrutiny should apply. Cent. Rabbini cal 
Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at *20 (citing Plaintiff's Motion at 5). 
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consent form requirement did not force them to speak. 21 It dealt with the 
claim as a facial challenge, and looked to whether "'no set of 
circumstances"' could render the requirement valid. 22 According to the 
court, parents could obtain the consent form from the Health Department 
website, or a pediatrician's office, which would "not involve 
communicative action by the mohelim" 23 and even in the odd circumstance 
where parents could not locate a form without the mohel 's assistance, "the 
mohel would still be free not to say anything or otherwise to undertake any 
communicative act" because, in lieu of speaking, he "simply could not 
perform [the procedure]" and "there would be no compelled speech." 24 
The result seems correct - the Constitution must permit a government 
agency to make certain that parents know they are choosing a procedure 
that carries the risk of death for their infant. But the conclusion that the 
government does not compel speech en route to this result cannot be right. 
At the very least, the parents are required to consent to the procedure by 
signing the form, and the mohelim are required to receive it. This is an act 
of communication that the government compels as a condition to engaging 
in an activity. It is no response that the individual can avoid the 
compulsion simply by refraining from engaging in the activity. It would 
not be a response in the core compelled speech cases - that Marie and 
Gathie Barnett could avoid the compelled speech inherent in the flag salute 
by staying home from school 25 or that George Maynard and his wife could 
avoid broadcasting New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto by failing 
to own or drive a car26 - and it is not an adequate response in this instance 
either. The New York City Health Department regulation compels speech, 
but the court was correct that it is not constitutionally suspect compelled 
speech of the flag salute or license plate variety . Because the ritual 
circumcision case involves a challenge to an explicitly labeled "consent 
form," it helpfully lays bare what is really going on in most of the 
compelled commercial speech cases. The government is defining the facts 
21 Id. at •21 ("Nowhere in the regulation are mohelim required to provide a consent form to parents 
or even to inform parents that such a form exists."). 
22 Id. (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2534 (2012) (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))). 
23 Id. 
2• Id. 
25 These sisters were the daughters of the lead plaintiff in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). David L. Hudson, Jr., Speech Commentary: Woman in Barnette 
Reflects on Famous Flag-Salute Case, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/woman-in-barnette-reflects-on-famous-flag-salute-case (noting 
that due to a clerk 's error, the case name misspells their last name, which was Barnett). 
26 Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. 705 (1977) . 
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that are material to creating legal and enforceable consent to an 
interpersonal transaction. 
This case of consent-to-circumcision illustrates my first point, which is 
that government entities require consent all the time without triggering 
heightened Free Speech Clause scrutiny. An agreement to have a mohel 
perform a circumcision is a contract. 27 A contract is an act of compelled 
communication - there must be offer and acceptance, and acceptance must 
entail consent. "Consent," however, is a term of art, which may be defined 
thinly or robustly by the state. 28 Governments have long required that 
"material" facts be disclosed to create a valid and enforceable contract. 
Fact finders may make the determination of which facts are material to a 
particular contract if its validity must be decided at trial. Alternatively, 
legislative or regulatory bodies may spell out facts material to particular 
contracts. And the judgments of these various decision makers may vary as 
to which facts are "material" and must be disclosed to create valid 
consent. 29 In either of these instances, the government compels the parties 
to a contract to communicate facts that the particular decision maker 
determines are relevant to the informed consent that makes the contract 
valid and enforceable. 
This government regulatory power to require the disclosure of facts 
material to informed consent is not limited to commercial contracts. 
Consent is a crucial element that renders many types of transactions legal 
and enforceable. Governments have always had the authority to define the 
facts that must be communicated and the circumstances that must exist to 
create this critical element of consent. Indeed, this regulatory authority 
extends deep into our everyday lives. Specifically, consent is often the 
crucial element that defines when transactions are torts or crimes. The 
doctrine of informed consent to medical procedures marks the line between 
a valid transaction and an assault or battery. 30 Thus, government entities 
compel the communication of facts they determine are material to 
informed consent and the reciprocal communication of consent every time 
we see a doctor to avoid tort liability. And this requirement of bilateral 
27 Mohelim are usually paid for their services, although they may not charge a set price. See Dovid 
Zaklikowski , No Set Payment for the Circumcision?: How Much Does a Mahe/ Cost?, 
CHABAD, http: //www. chabad.org/library /article_cdo /aid/1668419 /jewish/No-Set-Payment-for-the-Circ 
umcision .htm (last visited Feb. 25 , 2014) . 
28 See Brian H. Bix , Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251 (Franklin 
G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 20 I 0). 
29 See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material " in Securities 
law , 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 167 (2011). 
30 Peter M . Murray , The History of Informed Consent, 10 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J . 104 (1990). 
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communication of information and consent is not limited to the medical 
context where it evolved. It applies in any context where a touching would 
otherwise constitute a tort. For example, dentists, hair dressers, massage 
therapists and others must communicate information and secure consent. 
Consent makes what would be a theft legal. And the government 
effectively compels speech every time we have sex, because without the 
communication of consent, either implicitly or explicitly, the act is a 
crime. 31 The requirement that mohelim secure informed consent to perform 
a circumcision is no different than all of these other instances of day-to-day 
activities in which one party must secure consent to a physical touching or 
else face legal liability. The bottom line is that compelled speech to secure 
informed consent to interpersonal transactions is an ordinary exercise of 
government regulatory authority to protect health, safety and welfare. 
My second point is that the government power to require disclosures as 
part of a commercial transaction is not limited to correcting affirmatively 
"deceptive" or "misleading" speech. 32 Although Zauderer and Milavetz 
dealt with situations where the government required disclosures to correct 
deceptive or misleading speech, 33 there is no constitutional basis for 
limiting deferential review to that circumstance. The category of 
"deceptive" or "misleading" speech is not even actionable fraud; it does 
not otherwise have determinate meaning. 34 The pertinent question is why 
the government has the authority to require corrections to misleading 
speech. The broader authority is to define what facts must be disclosed to 
constitute valid and enforceable consent. 
31 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 130.05(1) (McKinney 2013)("Whether ornot specifically stated, it 
is an element of every offense defined in this article that the sexual act was committed without consent 
of the victim."). 
32 The Court in 'Zauderer articulated the rational basis standard of review in connection with the 
state's purpose of preventing consumer deception , and corporate litigants have seized on this language 
to argue that it limits the scope of judicial deference to commercial speech disclosure requirements. See 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
("[W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected so long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception ofconsumers.") . 
33 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010) ("[The] required 
disclosures are intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements -
specifically, the promise of debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy , 
which has inherent costs."); 'Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 653 ("The State's position that it is deceptive to 
employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability 
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability 
for costs be disclosed."). 
34 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False " is: Falsity and 
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) ('"The 
distinction between the true and the misleading is normative."' (quoting Steven Shiffiin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw . 
U. L. REv . 1212, 1219 (1983))). 
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The evolution of informed consent to medical procedures usefully 
illustrates the scope of the government's police power to compel disclosure 
of facts to ensure consent. The informed consent requirement began as an 
antidote inserted by the common law to respond to the practice of 
deceiving patients about the medical procedures to which they were 
submitting. 35 In its early manifestations, the doctrine required factual 
disclosures in order to counteract affirmative deception. As it has evolved, 
it has required a broad range of factual disclosures to fully inform a patient 
of the risks and benefits of a medical procedure in instances where no 
affirmative deceptive or misleading speech exists. The informed consent 
requirements have moved from common law to statutes in many 
jurisdictions, with the elements varying according to the judgments of the 
legislative decision makers. 36 Throughout this evolution, it has been 
assumed that the power to require these factual disclosures and define their 
specific terms falls within the state's power to protect health , safety and 
welfare, subject to deferential rational basis review. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 37 the 
plurality addressed the claim that disclosures to secure informed consent to 
abortion should be subject to greater than rational basis review. 
Pennsylvania required that the abortion provider inform the woman 
seeking an abortion "of the availability of printed material published by the 
State describing the fetus and providing information about medical 
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, 
and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as 
alternatives to abortion." 38 In response to the abortion providers' claim that 
the disclosure requirement unconstitutionally compelled them to speak, the 
plurality reasoned : 
35 See Murray, supra note 30. 
36 See Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decision Making Process, 5 J. LEGAL 
MED. 163 (I 984); Background: Requirements for Informed Consent, A Practical Guide to Informed 
Consent, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, http://www.templehealth.org/lCTOOLKIT / 
html/ictoolkitpage5.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) ("Informed consent is an ethical concept-that all 
patient s should understand and agree to the potential consequences of their care----that has become 
codified in the law and in daily practice at every medical institution . ... The case law and rules 
pertaining to informed consent have changed over the years and all 50 states now have legislation that 
requires some level of inform ed consent. Although the details of these laws vary from state to state, the 
bottom line is that failure to obtain informed consent renders any U.S . physician liable for negligence 
or battery and constitute s medical malpractice ." (citation omitted)). 
37 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
38 Id. at 881. 
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To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to 
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of 
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by 
the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the 
requirement that the physician provide the information 
mandated by the State here. 39 
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Although the plurality's explanation could have been less terse, its 
conclusion that factual disclosure requirements imposed upon doctors are 
subject to rational basis review because they fall within the state's 
licensing authority is consistent with the broad authority that government 
entities have always enjoyed to require and define the facts material to 
informed consent. 
The Casey plurality's affirmation that rational basis review applies to 
abortion disclosure requirements reveals that there is no basis to limit 
government authority to require disclosures in commercial contexts to 
those necessary to counter affirmatively deceptive or misleading speech. 
The particular factual disclosures at issue in Casey were not required to 
prevent deception. The doctors proposing to perform abortions had not said 
anything affirmatively deceptive or misleading about the developmental 
stage of the fetuses or the options available to women if they chose 
· childbirth. 40 The government imposed the disclosure requirements to 
remind women to think beyond their own interests to consider the welfare 
of the fetus.41 Despite the fact that patients would not be deceived or 
misled by an absence of speech, the plurality found that the state had broad 
police power authority to require doctors to disclose facts the government 
had decided were relevant - or should be relevant - to women's consent to 
abortion procedures. 42 
The Court's decisions in Zauderer and Milavetz addressed disclosure 
requirements imposed in response to advertisements. In this context, the 
Court stated that the government has the authority to impose disclosure 
requirements to counter deceptive or misleading speech. 43 But, viewed in 
light of abortion disclosures, these cases address only a subset of the police 
power authority to require disclosures that ensure informed consent. The 
39 Id. at 884 ( citations omitted) . 
40 See id. at 883 (calling the infonnation given in this case "truthful" and "nonmisleading "). 
41 Id. at 877 (noting that the infonnation delivery requirement created "a structural mechanism by 
which the State ... may express profound respect for the life of the unborn"). 
42 Id. at 884-85. 
43 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , PA v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 251-52 (201 O); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) . 
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information disclosures imposed upon doctors have evolved beyond 
preventing deception to requiring information that a majority of the 
population decides should be relevant to an individual patient's consent. 
There is no basis in the Constitution to find a greater police power 
authority to compel doctor speech than the speech of lawyers or merchants. 
So long as the disclosures required by the state in Casey are subject to 
rational basis review, similar disclosures imposed on parties to other 
professional and commercial transactions must be subject to deferential 
review as well, even if the disclosures are not aimed at countering 
affirmatively misleading speech. 
Review of the ritual circumcision case against the disclosure 
requirements approved in Casey reinforces the conclusion that the 
government police power to define the facts material to consent must 
logically and consistently extend beyond facts necessary to correct 
affirmatively misleading speech . The mohelim did not provoke the 
requirement that they ensure that parents received facts relating to health 
risks associated with the circumcision procedure by affirmatively 
advertising that the procedure was safe . Nevertheless, the New York City 
Health Department reasonably determined that knowledge of the risk of 
death to their child was relevant to the parents' informed consent. 
Likewise, in the absence of affirmative misrepresentations by abortion 
providers, Pennsylvania required that women be informed of the 
approximate age and characteristics of the fetuses they sought to abort. The 
source of authority exercised by the government entities, the free speech 
interests of the service providers , and the interests of the parties seeking 
the services relevant to informed consent are the same in both instances, 
and so, too, must be the degree of deference of a court's Free Speech 
Clause review. 
My third point is that understanding that governments have the 
regulatory authority to define the information material to valid consent, 
subject to deferential rational basis review, groups compelled commercial 
speech into two categories : those in which the government compels 
commercial speakers to convey information about their products or 
services to potential consumers, and those in which the government 
compels commercial speakers to convey other types of information or 
convey information to individuals who are not potential consumers . 
Grouping the cases in this way is helpful in a number of ways. It identifies 
the cases that fall outside the Casey/Zauderer paradigm and require a 
different justification for the government action , which may or may not 
warrant low level judicial review. It also identifies the cases that fall inside 
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the Casey/Zauderer paradigm but nevertheless potentially trigger 
heightened review because the compelled speech impacts a separately 
protected constitutional right. The cases that remain reveal that the 
constitutional question in cases in which the government compels 
commercial speech to inform consent reduces to determining which types 
of information and manners of communicating information fall outside the 
boundaries of reasonably informing a potential consumer's consent. I will 
discuss each of these in turn. 
Grouping the cases in terms of a government purpose to inform consent 
identifies instances of compelled commercial speech that are out of bounds 
and need to be separately justified because the government does not or 
cannot plausibly claim that the disclosure requirements are imposed for 
this reason. The compelled subsidy for generic advertising cases fall 
outside the Casey/Zauderer paradigm. 44 Requirement of disclosures after 
the commercial transaction, such as requirements that providers report 
information related to abortions, 45 pharmacies report the types and 
frequency of drug prescriptions, 46 or parties report real estate sale prices 47 
must be justified by a government purpose other than defining information 
relevant to consent. 48 Within cases, as well, some disclosure requirements 
may fall within the Casey/Zauderer paradigm and others outside it. For 
example , a requirement that a center offering pregnancy counseling post a 
sign stating that "'the Center does not have a licensed medical professional 
on staff" falls within the paradigm whereas a sign stating that the county 
health officer "'encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult 
with a licensed health care provider"' falls outside the paradigm and 
requires a justification other than informing consent. 49 
44 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 
533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
45 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (reviewing under the Due Process Clause a requirement that 
providers report abortions after they occur and noting that such requirements are valid if "reasonably 
directed to the preservation of maternal health") . 
46 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (upholding against a Due Process Clause 
challenge a state requirement that doctors disclose the names of persons obtaining certain drugs, 
finding it to be "a reasonable exercise of [the state's] broad police powers"). 
47 Jay MacDonald, BANK.RATE .COM, Should Home Sale Prices Stay Secret?, MSN REAL ESTATE, 
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid= 13107736 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (reporting 
that 37 states require full disclosure of home sale prices). 
48 See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and 
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 555, 562 
(2006) ("[F]requently the disclosure of information is required in order to promote transparent and 
efficient markets."). 
49 See, e.g., Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Montgomery Cnty. Resolution No. 16-1252), ajJ'd sub nom. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 
722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (en bane). 
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Most instances of compelled disclosures are aimed at informing 
consent, so recognizing these instances as presumptively valid reveals 
cases where judicial scrutiny may be higher - not because the compelled 
speech alone provokes heightened scrutiny, but because the compulsion 
impacts a separately protected constitutional right. Recognizing that 
heightened scrutiny is provoked by individual rights guarantees entirely 
separate from the Free Speech Clause helps to eliminate the confusion in 
the compelled commercial speech jurisprudence by making clear that in 
most instances of compelled commercial speech, where the compulsion 
stands alone for the purpose of informing consent to the transaction, 
rational basis applies. 
The most evident informed consent requirements that may burden a 
separately protected constitutional right are those imposed by states on 
abortion providers. The disclosure requirements do not provoke heightened 
Free Speech Clause scrutiny because they fall within the state's police 
power to require delivery of information relevant to informed consent to 
the transaction. The separate question, however, is whether the same 
information delivery requirements impose an undue burden on the right to 
choose abortion prior to viability, which the substantive portion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects. 50 Although the 
plurality in Casey upheld the information delivery requirements before it 
under both the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses, its Due Process 
inquiry was more detailed and prolonged. 51 More aggressive abortion 
disclosure requirements subsequently imposed by state legislatures may 
violate the Constitution because they impose an undue burden on a 
woman's right to choose abortion prior to viability, even though they do 
not infringe upon free speech. 
Video game labeling requirements are another example of disclosure 
requirements that may burden a separately protected constitutional right. 
The United States Supreme Court recently made clear that strict scrutiny 
applies to violent video game labeling Jaws because the labels are content-
based restrictions on fully protected speech. 52 Prior to this decision, a 
circuit court had addressed a challenge to a similar labeling requirement 
imposed on sexually explicit video games. According to that court, 
Zauderer's deferential review did not apply because the "18" sticker, 
which designated sexually explicit speech, went beyond "purely factual 
5° Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
51 See id. at 846-53, 870-79, 881-84, 884-85 . 
52 Brown v. Entm ' t Merchs. Ass 'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-39 (2011) . 
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disclosures" and communicated "a subjective and highly controversial 
message." 53 But governments require labels with evaluative judgments 
about safety, healthfulness, and age-appropriateness in many other 
instances without provoking heightened scrutiny. The reason that the 
scrutiny increases when governments label video games is that the product 
is separately protected as speech. 
The ritual circumcision case provides a final example of a disclosure 
requirement intersecting with a separately protected constitutional right. 
Like video game vendors, the mohelim argued that the consent form 
requirement unconstitutionally compelled them to communicate the 
government's "subjective advice." 54 But, as noted above, this claim alone 
is not sufficient to render the consent form requirement unconstitutional. 
The reason that the mohelim's claim could possibly be successful is that, in 
addition to the Free Speech Clause claim, the mohelim argued that the 
disclosure requirement unconstitutionally burdened their free exercise of 
religion. 55 The district court rejected this argument, finding no 
constitutional violation according to the standard of review that applies to 
the Free Exercise Clause . 56 However, like the examples listed above, if 
heightened review were to be applied to a disclosure requirement like that 
imposed by the New York City Health Department, it would be because it 
burdened the separate free exercise right. 
Once we identify the disclosure requirements that are outside of the 
Casey/Zauderer paradigm, either because they do not aim at informing 
consent or they intersect with another constitutional right, we are left with 
the bulk of the compelled commercial disclosure cases where the 
government plausibly asserts a purpose to require disclosure of information 
relevant to informed consent. This is very helpful. Now the constitutional 
inquiry is narrowed to one that does not necessarily have a clear answer, 
but is nevertheless quite manageable: What types of information and 
manners of presentation may a government rationally determine are 
relevant to consent? 
Once this segregation of information-relevant-to-consent cases is made, 
we can look at the cases and ask the right questions. Many, many 
disclosure requirements exist, and it is possible to arrange them on a 
53 Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich , 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
54 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 14, Cent. 
Rabbinical Cong. of the USA & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep ' t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12 Civ. 
7590(NRB) , 2013 WL 126399 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013), 2012 WL 5461809. 
55 Id . at 21-27. 
56 Cent. Rabbinical Cong., 2013 WL 126399, at* 17. 
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spectrum according to the types of information required to be disclosed 
and the manners of presentation in order to analyze them to determine 
which of these should significantly alter the constitutional inquiry. I will 
not offer a full analysis here, but will sketch the spectrum of disclosure 
requirements to identify some of the questions about types of information 
and manners of presentation that must be addressed. 
Are there types of facts that are outside the boundary of what a 
government entity can rationally determine is relevant or should be 
relevant to a consumer's informed consent? The Zauderer and Milavetz 
cases involved disclosures relating to price, which relates to the interest of 
the immediate consumer and is undoubtedly at the heart of a commercial 
exchange. Many disclosure requirements relate to product qualities, such 
as requirements that sellers disclose the attributes of securities, 57 the 
ingredients of a food item, 58 the hazardous chemicals in a pesticide, 59 or 
the average mileage that a vehicle will attain per gallon of gas. 60 Other 
disclosures relate to what is not in a product, such as the requirement that 
pajama vendors disclose those that are not flame resistant 61 or the 
voluntary label that milk vendors sought to apply denoting that the product 
was "rbST Free." 62 
Many disclosure requirements relate to the consequences of using the 
product or instructions for proper use. Some of these disclosures relate 
primarily to consequences to the immediate consumer, such as prescription 
drug warnings and instructions, disclosure of the trans-fat content in a food 
item, 63 a disclosure about cell phone radiation risk, 64 and instructions that 
57 See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Oct. I , 2013) ("Often referred to as the 'truth in 
securities' law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: require that investors receive 
financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and 
prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities."). 
58 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. JOI (2013) (setting out federal nutrition labeling requirements). 
59 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Chapter 5: Ingredient Statement Pesticides, in LABEL REVIEW 
MANUAL 5-10 (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl /labelingilrrn/label-review-
manual.pdf. 
60 Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478 (July 6, 
2011). 
61 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, NEWS RELEASE No. 00129, NEW LABELS ON 
CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR ALERT PARENTS TO FIRE DANGERS (2000), available at 
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2000/New-Labels-on-Childrens-Sleepwear-Alert-
Parents-to-Fire-Dangers/ . 
62 Int'! Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010) (striking down Ohio ban on 
"rbST Free" labels). 
63 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.9, 101.36 (2013) (setting out the required declaration of trans fatty acids in 
the nutrition label of conventional foods and dietary supplements, respectively). 
2014] Compelled Consent Speech 531 
pajamas be worn snugly so as not to catch fire. 65 Other disclosures relate to 
consequences that implicate both the interests of the immediate consumer 
and of the public more generally, such as alcohol labeling that warns of the 
dangers of ingesting during pregnancy or of drunk driving, 66 disclosures 
that foods are genetically modified, 67 and labels that disclose car rnileage 68 
or appliance energy efficiency. 69 Still other disclosures relate primarily to 
disclosing the public harms that relate to the product, such as warnings on 
tobacco products about secondhand smoke, 70 information about proper 
disposal of products containing mercury, 71 and securities disclosures 
relating to whether the investments are "DRC conflict free." 72 
Beyond the type of fact presented is its manner of presentation. Any 
presentation of facts is selective and depends upon the judgment of a 
government entity of relevance. The question is how and why the 
Constitution may limit a government entity's discretion to determine 
relevance. Must the government demonstrate some sort of harm, whether 
to the immediate consumer, the general public or both, from 
nondisclosure? If so, to what degree of certainty must the "risk" exist when 
experts disagree, as with the "risks" of genetically modified products, or of 
64 See CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(reviewing a San Francisco ordinance requiring cell phone retailers to inform consumers about the 
potential health risks of cell phone use). 
65 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETYCOMM'N, supra note 61. 
66 See 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2012) (requiring the following statement on all alcohol beverages for sale 
or distribution in the U.S. containing not less than 0.5% alcohol by volume: "GOVERNMENT 
WARNING: (I) According to the Surgeon General, women should not drink alcoholic beverages 
during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs 
your ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause health problems"). 
67 No laws yet require that genetically modified foods be labeled for sale in the United States. See 
Elizabeth Weise, Washington State Voters Reject Labeling of GMO Foods, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2013, 
http ://www.usatoday.com/ story/news/nati on/2013/ 11 /06/wash ington-state-voters-rej ect-gmo-labeing/3 
450705/. 
68 Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478 (July 6, 
2011) . 
69 The Environmental Protection Agency Energy Star Labeling System allows appliance 
manufacturers to choose to qualify and display an Energy Star label. See How a Product Earns the 
Energy Star Label, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov /certified-products/how-product-eams-
label (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) . 
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l) (2012) (requiring cigarette packages to carry one of nine new 
warnings, one of which is: "WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers"). 
71 Nat ' ! Elec. Mfrs . Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state requirement that 
manufacturers of some mercury containing products label them to inform consumers about proper 
disposal). 
72 Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(l)(A)(ii) (West 2013) (requiring companies to 
disclose that their products are not "DRC conflict free," which means that a product does not contain 
conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance armed groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo) . 
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cell phone use? 73 Is there some limit to the authority of government entities 
to require disclosure of their evaluative judgments, such as percentage of 
daily recommended nutritional value, age-appropriateness for toys and 
health inspection grades for restaurants? Are there standards a government 
entity must apply to reach a valid evaluative judgment? Are particular 
government decision makers permitted by the Constitution to make and 
mandate the disclosure of evaluative judgments more freely than others? 74 
In addition, does it matter how the disclosure is presented? Many 
required disclosures are explicitly normative such as "Don't use this drug 
in combination with alcohol" or "Don't use this product near flame." Is it 
less constitutionally suspect or more so if the warnings are explicitly 
presented as government speech, such as the surgeon general's warning on 
cigarette packages or the consent form required for ritual circumcision? 
May required disclosures include symbols, such as a skull and crossbones 
for danger, or green and red lights for food recommendations? May 
government entities mandate a form of disclosure to grab the consumer's 
attention or use emotion to drive home the meaning of fact? Many 
disclosure requirements contain size-of-print or placement requirements 
for information . 75 The graphic tobacco labels recently mandated by the 
Food and Drug Administration raise these questions in combination, by 
imposing text, color, graphic, size and placement requirements to inform 
consumers about the dangers of cigarette use. 76 
These questions about the type of fact and manner of presentation 
remain open and are, to some extent, vexing. They are, however, limited, 
73 See CTIA-The Wireless Ass 'n v. City & Cnty . of S.F., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 
201 I) ("San Francisco ' s claimed interest falls short of protecting the public from a 'known ' carcinogen 
or even from a 'probable ' carcinogen but amounts only to protecting the public from a 'possible ' 
carcinogen , meaning that no one yet knows if the agent (RF radiation) is actually harmful ( or not). "). 
74 See Tushnet , supra note 34, at 253 (noting the problem of choosing the decision maker in the 
context of determining the truth or falsity of information on product labels). 
75 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPLYING WITH THE FUNERAL RULE 26 (2012), available at 
http://www.business.ftc .gov/sites/defaul t/files/pdf/BUS05-complyfuneral.pdf ("You must make all the 
required disclosures to consumers in a clear and conspicuous manner. Your goal should be to present 
the information in a reasonably understandable form . In addition , the disclosures must be legible. The 
print or type must be large and prominent enough that consumers can easily notice and read the 
information ."); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND BOXED WARNING SECTIONS OF 
LABELING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS - CONTENT AND FORMAT (2011) , 
available at http ://www.fda .gov/downloads/Drugs /GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/ 
Guidances /ucm075096.pdf (describing , inter alia, the "boxed warnings " that highlight urgent dangers ). 
76 The FDA is reconsidering the content of the labels after Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court judge's injunction blocking the original versions from taking 
effect. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin ., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ; Steve 
Almasy, FDA Changes Course on Graphic Warning Labels for Cigarettes, CNN , Mar. 20, 2013 , 
http ://www .cnn. com/2013 /03/ 19/health/fd a-graphic-tobacco-warnings /. 
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and by lining up the many disclosure requirements that exist, it is very 
possible to identify common attributes and to draw principled lines. 
Recognizing that most of the instances that we call compelled commercial 
speech fall within the broad police power of government entities to require 
disclosure of facts they determine to be relevant to consent to interpersonal 
transactions cabins the inquiry: what types of facts and manners of 
disclosure may a government determine are rationally related to informing 
consent? The answers may not be easy, but with this question in mind, we 
can clear away much of the confusion that currently exists in compelled 
commercial speech cases. And that is a helpful step toward a coherent and 
principled jurisprudence. 
